criminal law

affirmative defense

aggravating circumstances

Alleyne v. United States

A jury found Allen Alleyne guilty of robbery under a federal statue, but the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing a weapon during the robbery. A federal criminal statute provides that a judge can raise the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant brandished a firearm. Thus, a judge’s finding can raise the mandatory minimum prison sentence even when a jury was unable to come to that same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed such findings from judges in Harris v. United States. Now, the court will reconsider that position or have the opportunity to further clarify how much sentencing discretion can be given to judges under federal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled.

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Issue(s)

Should the Supreme Court overrule Harris v. United States and require that a jury find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence beyond the ordinarily prescribed statutory maximum?

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assault

Assault is generally defined as an intentional act that puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. No physical injury is required, but the actor must have intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the victim and the victim must have thereby been put in immediate apprehension of such a contact.

autopsy

Autopsy, borrowed from the Greek term autopsia – meaning “the act of seeing with one’s own eyes” – means the detailed medical examination and/or dissection of a dead body to determine the cause of death or for any scientific and medical purpose.

Barnes v. Felix

Issues

When analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force, should courts consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts should consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened when analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force. The Fifth Circuit applies the “moment of the threat” doctrine when analyzing the reasonableness of the use of deadly force by a police officer. Under the “moment of the threat” doctrine, the court can only consider the instance at which an officer deployed the deadly force in its reasonableness analysis. Barnes argues that the “moment of the threat” doctrine should be rejected because it contravenes precedents established by the Supreme Court and because it raises impossible line-drawing problems. Felix counters that the “moment of the threat” doctrine is consistent with precedent and is a straightforward analysis that does not raise line-drawing issues. The outcome of this case has strong implications for law enforcement and community relations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether courts should apply the "moment of the threat" doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix, Jr. shot and killed Ashtian Barnes after a traffic stop. Barnes v. Felix at 2. Before the killing, the Harris County Toll Road Authority provided Felix with a plate number that had outstanding violations.

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battery

Beckles v. United States

Issues

Does the Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply retroactively to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines?

The Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), makes the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines void for vagueness and, if so, whether this new rule gives relief to Petitioner Travis Beckles by retroactively applying to collateral cases challenging federal sentences under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Beckles argues that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson because the residual clauses in both cases are identical, and the Court held that the clause in Johnson was void for vagueness. Beckles also asserts that this new rule applies retroactively under the Court’s test in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Respondent the United States argues, however, that Beckles’s new rule would not apply retroactively because it is a procedural rather than a substantive rule, and thus the Court should reject his request at this threshold. The United States further argues that if the Court does reach the merits, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness with respect to those applications expressly specified in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2) because this commentary clarifies the otherwise vague guideline. This case will address whether retroactive resentencing for “career offenders” will burden the federal system and will clarify the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of due process concerns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), deemed unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining "violent felony"). The residual clause invalidated in Johnson is identical to the residual clause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining "crime of violence").

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)?
  2. Whether Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review?
  3. Whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a "crime of violence" only in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a "crime of violence" after Johnson?

In 2007, police arrested Travis Beckles after recovering a sawed-off shotgun in his residence. See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 837–38 (11th Cir. 2009). At trial, the jury found Beckles guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

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