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Carlsbad Technology, Inc. V. HIF Bio, Inc.

Issues

Whether a district court's order to remand a case to state court after declining supplemental jurisdiction is properly considered a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), therefore preventing a court of appeals from reviewing the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

 

Respondents HIF Bio, Inc. and BizBiotech Company, Ltd. sued petitioners Carlsbad Technology, Inc. ("CTI") and others in state court. CTI removed the case to a federal district court, which soon after granted a motion to dismiss a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. The district court then remanded the case back to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining  state law  claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to review the matter, asserting it lacked jurisdiction to do so. In this case, the United States Supreme Court considers whether a district court's order to remand a case to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), thus barring the order from appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This case will address a procedural issue that the Supreme Court's decisions in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) and Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2007) left open to conflicting interpretations by the courts of appeals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988), this Court held that district courts could remand removed claims upon deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). However, in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2007), the Court stated that "it is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)" and noted that "[w]e have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)." Construing Powerex as leaving the question open, the Federal Circuit held that a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thus disagreeing with the nine other federal courts of appeals that have construed Cohill as distinguishing between remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remands based on declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that already exists. Thus, this petition presents the question posed but left unanswered in Powerex that is now the subject of a direct conflict among the circuits:

1. Whether a district court's order remanding a case to state court following its discretionary decision to decline to exercise the supplemental jurisdiction accorded to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is properly held to be a remand for a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) so that such remand order is barred from any appellate review by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

From 1999 to 2001, Korean researchers Jong-Wan Park ("Park") and Yang-Sook Chun ("Chun") studied a potential cancer-fighting chemical compound. See HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., Ltd. et al., 508 F.3d 659, 660-61 (Fed. Cir.

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City of San Antonio, Texas v. Hotels.com, L.P.

Issues

May district courts deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether district courts have the discretion to adjust “taxable” appellate costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e). In 2006, a district court entered judgment for Petitioner City of San Antonio and taxed appellate costs against Respondent Hotels.com. In 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court judgment and ordered the City of San Antonio to pay appellate costs to Hotels.com. The City of San Antonio argues that the permissive language of “taxable” in Rule 39(e) and the bifurcated structure of the subdivisions of Rule 39 justify district courts’ discretionary authority to adjust appellate costs after the appellate court has determined which parties are entitled to costs. Hotels.com argues that the mandatory language of Rule 39(e) justifies the Fifth Circuit’s decision and that appellate courts are better equipped to determine the question of appellate costs. The outcome of this case has implications for the allocation of appellate costs between parties in litigation where appellate bonds, penalties, and interest can reach millions of dollars, as well as the efficiency of court proceedings concerning the determination of appellate costs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit alone has held, district courts “lack[] discretion to deny or reduce” appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e).

In 2006, the City of San Antonio filed a class action lawsuit against online travel companies (“OTCs”), including Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, for failure to pay municipal hotel occupancy taxes in full. City of San Antonio v.

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Greer v. United States

Issues

May a circuit court of appeals review matters outside the trial record when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the proper evidentiary scope of plain-error review under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the bounds of the reviewing court’s discretion to provide the defendant a remedy for such an error. A jury found the petitioner, Gregory Greer, guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon. However, the prosecution did not prove to the jury that Greer knew about his felony status—a fact that the Supreme Court subsequently held is an element that the prosecution must prove. On review, the appellate court found that there was no plain error in Greer’s case because he had stipulated to his felony status before the jury trial. Greer contends that the appellate court could not consider evidence on plain-error review that was not presented to the jury at trial, given the text of Rule 52 and Greer’s constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. The United States responds that a reviewing court may look to matters outside the trial record in order to determine whether an error at trial meets the requirements that allow the court to exercise its remedial discretion, such as whether the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial or adversely affects the reputation of the judicial proceedings. The outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision will have important implications for matters of fundamental fairness and the balance between judge and jury.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States, a circuit court of appeals may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.

In August 2017, police officers engaged Petitioner Gregory Greer in conversation outside of a hotel room in Jacksonville, Florida. United States v. Greer, 798 Fed. Appx. 483, 484–85 (2020). After observing Greer touch the right side of his waistband several times, the officers informed Greer that they would conduct a pat-down search.

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Murphy v. Smith

Issues

Whether a statute that allows a prisoner-plaintiff’s lawyer to be awarded attorney’s fees grants discretion to the district court to apportion up to 25% of the prisoner-plaintiff’s monetary judgment towards attorney’s fees, or prevents the district court from exercising discretion and instead requires that the prisoner-plaintiff’s attorney receive exactly 25% of the judgment?

Charles Murphy, an inmate at Vandalia Correctional Center in Vandalia, Illinois, was choked, physically struck, and pushed head-first into a metal toilet—after already losing consciousness—by two correctional officers, Robert Smith and Gregory Fulk. Murphy successfully sued both correctional officers and was awarded a monetary judgment; the district court then held that 10% of the judgment would be applied to attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the correctional officers’ liability but reversed the district court’s apportionment of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, holding that the text of the statute required that exactly 25% of the judgment be awarded as attorney’s fees. Murphy argues that both the plain text and the legislative history of the statute indicate that courts have discretion when apportioning attorney’s fees. Smith and Fulk counter that the statute’s text and history point to an exact 25% requirement. In addition to legal analysis, the Supreme Court might also consider wisdom of giving district courts discretion in this context, particularly with regard to the impact discretion would have on deterring government officials from violating prisoners’ federal rights and on discouraging frivolous litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When a prisoner obtains a monetary judgment in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s lawyer is awarded attorney’s fees, “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). The defendant pays the remainder of the attorney’s fees.

The question presented is whether the parenthetical phrase “not to exceed 25 percent” means any amount up to 25 percent (as four circuits hold), or whether it means exactly 25 percent (as the Seventh Circuit holds).

Petitioner Charles Murphy was an inmate at Vandalia Correctional Center in Vandalia, Illinois. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2016). On July 25, 2011, Respondents Robert Smith and Gregory Fulk, both correctional officers, physically struck Murphy and then left him in a cell without medical assistance.

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United States v. Texas

Issues

Are states required to suffer direct injuries to sue the federal government? Are the Department of Homeland Security’s September 2021 immigration enforcement guidelines, which authorize discretion to enforce immigration statutes, contrary to federal immigration law or the Administrative Procedure Act, and can a court vacate the guidelines?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether Texas and Louisiana may sue the federal government in federal court despite not having suffered a direct injury from agency action, and whether the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) September 2021 Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (“Guidelines”) violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Court must also decide whether the INA prevents a court from vacating an administrative action under the APA. The United States claims that Texas and Louisiana cannot sue the federal government because the Constitution requires a direct harm, that the Guidelines do not violate the INA because the statutory language accommodates traditional prosecutorial discretion, and that the INA prevented the district court from vacating the Guidelines. Texas and Louisiana counter that they can sue because a direct injury is not required when a state sues the federal government, that the Guidelines violate the INA because the statutory language specifically override prosecutorial discretion, and that the district court properly vacated the Guidelines because it was authorized by the broad statutory language and court precedent and did not conflict with the INA. The Court’s holding will affect the removal for noncitizens, which significantly impacts the social treatment of and rhetoric surrounding noncitizens, government efficiency and accountability, and public health, safety, and stability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law;

(2) whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure Act; and

(3) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

In January 2021, the then-Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a memorandum. Texas v. United States at 2.

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