Fifth Amendment

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States

Issues

Under the Fifth Amendment, does temporary, government-induced flooding require compensation to the owner of the flooded property?

 

Petitioner, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (the “Commission”) sued Respondent, the United States, for a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which compels the government to compensate parties when the government physically seizes property. Specifically, the Commission argues that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) permanently destroyed trees in a bottomland hardwood forest in Arkansas by intermittently flooding the forest for six years. The United States asserts that the actions of the Corps did not constitute a taking because the Corps did not oust the Commission of possession of the forest, and only a continuous invasion qualifies as a physical taking. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether a temporary invasion is a taking which will affect the meaning of the Takings Clause as it is used in future disputes concerning the destruction of property. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, a constitutional entity of the State of Arkansas, sought just compensation from the United States under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for physically taking its bottomland hardwood timber through six consecutive years of protested flooding during the sensitive growing season. The Court of Federal Claims awarded $5.7 million, finding that the Army Corps of Engineers' actions foreseeably destroyed and degraded more than 18 million board feet of timber, left habitat unable to regenerate, and preempted Petitioner's use and enjoyment.

The Federal Circuit, with its unique jurisdiction over takings claims, reversed the trial judgment on a single point of law. Contrary to this Court's precedent, a sharply divided 2-1 panel ruled that the United States did not inflict a taking because its actions were not permanent and the flooding eventually stopped. The Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc in a fractured 7-4 vote.

The question presented is: Whether government actions that impose recurring flood invasions must continue permanently to take property within the meaning of the Takings Clause.

The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (“the Commission”) is an agency that works to regulate and preserve Wildlife Management Areas in Arkansas. See Our Mission, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, http://www.agfc.com/aboutagfc/Pages/AboutMission.aspx. One of the areas that the Commission manages (the “Management Area”) is a bottomland hardwood forest in the Upper Mississippi

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Issues

Is the 30-day deadline to file a petition for the Tax Court to review its prior determination classified as a jurisdictional requirement that adheres to the exact amount of days prescribed and is not subject to certain fair exceptions or as a claim-processing rule subject to pausing the running time period for just considerations?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a 30-day filing deadline serves as a flexible procedural rule or a limitation on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner Boechler argues that the filing deadline is a procedural rule that is subject to the remedy of equitable tolling to effectively grant extensions in appropriate circumstances. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue counters that the 30-day filing deadline proscribes a jurisdictional prerequisite, limiting the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to only those petitions that were timely filed within the 30-day period. The outcome of this case has important implications for the treatment of tax law, interpretation of filing deadlines within interconnected statutory schemes, and disparate outcomes for low-income taxpayers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the deadline established by 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1) for seeking Tax Court review of a determination of the Internal Revenue Service Independent Office of Appeals following a collection due process hearing is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

In June 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified a small North Dakota law firm, Boechler, P.C. (“Boechler”), about missing tax document submissions. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, at 762.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Borden v. United States

Issues

Does classifying a crime committed with a mental state of recklessness as a violent felony expand the reach of the Armed Criminal Career Act beyond its intended purpose?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 includes crimes in which an individual used force recklessly. Petitioner Charles Borden asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that committing a crime with a mens rea of recklessness constitutes a violent felony because the mental state of recklessness does not include the intention or knowledge that would satisfy the requirement of using force “against the person of another.” Respondent United States counters that a mens rea of recklessness satisfies the element because the focus is on the “use” of the physical force, which does not discern between mental states. The outcome of this case has important implications for criminal procedure, due process rights, and the necessary interpretation of the text of the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

In the course of a traffic stop in April 2017, police found Petitioner Charles Borden in possession of a pistol. United States v. Borden at 266.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Emma Cueto, 5 Supreme Court Access To Justice Cases To Watch, Law360 (Oct. 4, 2020).

Submit for publication
0

Boyle v. United States

Issues

Does the United States need to prove the existence of a group with an identifiable structure, that goes beyond the racketeering activities at issue, in order to prove an association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO Act?

 

A jury convicted Edmund Boyle of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and sentenced him to 151 months in prison for his participation in a string of bank robberies. Boyle appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit, arguing that the United States misinterpreted the scope of an "enterprise" under RICO. Boyle argued that RICO did not apply because the United States could not prove that the group of bank robbers was an enterprise if it could not prove the group had a formal, ascertainable structure. The United States argued that the individuals were an enterprise and that they did not need to prove a formal structure existed under RICO. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted Boyle's petition to determine a three-way circuit split over what constitutes an enterprise under the RICO statute. The outcome of this case will affect the scope of the RICO Act and will impact the ability of law enforcement to prosecute individuals under the RICO Act.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does proof of an association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d), require at least some showing of an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages an exceptionally important question in the administration of federal justice, civil and criminal, that has spawned a three-way circuit split?

    Indictment and Trial

    In 2003, a New York grand jury indicted Edmund Boyle and eight other men on Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act conspiracy charges, claiming that they all participated in a series of bank robberies as members of an organization called the "Night Drop Crew." See Brief for Petitioner Edmund Boyle at 5-6,

    Written by

    Edited by

    Submit for publication
    0

    Brown v. Davenport

    Issues

    May a federal court grant a defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon finding a trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the defendant; or, must the court also determine that the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a difference in judicial opinion among several federal courts of appeal regarding which standard is appropriate for granting federal habeas relief. Petitioner Ervine Lee Davenport (“Davenport”) contends that the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Brecht v. Abrahamson, which requires that a defendant experience a “substantial and injurious effect” due to a trial error, is satisfactory. Respondent Mike Brown (“Brown”), Acting Warden, argues that the standard invoked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in Chapman v. California should instead apply. For a federal court to grant relief under Chapman v. California, a trial error must not be “harmless,” and the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California must be “unreasonable” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The outcome of this case will affect how much deference federal courts give to state courts’ interpretations of AEDPA, as well as the ability of defendants to successfully obtain relief in federal habeas proceedings. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a federal habeas court may grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the test from Brecht v. Abrahamson is satisfied, or whether the court must also find that the state court’s application of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

    On January 13, 2007, Ervine Lee Davenport and Annette White were drinking alcohol and using cocaine at a friend’s house when White began acting belligerently. Davenport v. MacLaren at 2.  Several of White’s friends asked her to leave, and Davenport offered to drive White home. Id. Davenport testified that during the drive, White grabbed the steering wheel and sliced his arm with a box cutter. Id.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Keir Weyble for his guidance and insights into this case.

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

    Issues

    Does an access regulation promulgated by the California Agricultural Relations Board constitute an unconstitutional governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment because it allows union organizers to speak to agricultural workers on their employer’s land at specified times during certain periods of the year?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state access regulation that requires agricultural employers to allow union organizers to enter their property to speak with their employees during certain parts of the workday constitutes a governmental taking of the employer’s private property without just compensation. Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company contend that allowing union organizers on their land is a per se regulatory taking because it is essentially the same as a permanent physical occupation of the employer’s land for a public purpose, and without compensation, this taking is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Victoria Hassid, the Chair of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board that promulgated the regulation at issue, argues that only narrow categories of regulations have been recognized as per se regulatory takings and that if the Court expanded the categories to include this access regulation, it would imperil many existing state and federal regulations. The outcome of this case has serious implications for agricultural workers’ access to information about labor unions, existing state and federal regulations that allow access to private property, and the rights enjoyed by private property owners.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.

    In 1975, California passed the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA” or “Act”), which established the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“ALRB” or “Board”). Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma at 526. The ALRB found that there were few opportunities for unions to communicate with agricultural workers, which interfered with the workers’ right to organize.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    City of Hays v. Vogt

    Issues

    Does the prosecution’s use of allegedly compelled statements at a pretrial hearing, not at a criminal trial, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, particularly the clause’s applicability to probable cause hearings. Petitioner, the City of Hays, argues that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only during a criminal trial and that they should therefore not be civilly liable for the introduction of an incriminatory statement during a pretrial hearing. Respondent Matthew Vogt contends that his Fifth Amendment right applies to an entire “criminal case,” which includes pretrial proceedings. This case may resolve questions about the scope of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, as well as issues relating to judicial efficiency and internal workplace investigations.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when allegedly compelled statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.

    In 2013, Matthew Vogt, a police officer in the City of Hays, Kansas, applied for a new position with the City of Haysville’s police department. See Vogt v. City of Hays, Kansas, 844 F.3d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 2017). In his application to the City of Haysville police department, Vogt acknowledged that he had kept a knife which he had obtained while working as a Hays police officer. See id.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    civil forfeiture

    Civil forfeiture allows the government (typically the police) to seize — and then keep or sell — any property that is allegedly involved in a crime or illegal activity. Owners need not ever be arrested or convicted of a crime for their cash, cars, or even real estate to be taken away permanently by the government.

    civil procedure

    Corley v. United States

    Issues

    Whether federal law requires that a confession  taken  more than six hours after a defendant's arrest, and before the defendant appears before the magistrate judge, must be suppressed if there was unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before the judge.

     

    When Johnnie Corley was arrested for assaulting an officer and interrogated about the robbery of a credit union, he did not confess to a role in the robbery until more than six hours after his arrest. Moreover, Corley did not appear before a magistrate judge until the next day. After the District Court found Corley guilty, the Third Circuit affirmed. Corley is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether, if there was unreasonable delay in bringing a suspect before a magistrate judge, the suspect's confession is still valid. The Supreme Court's decision will affect suspects' rights and the procedure that police must follow during a confession.

     

      Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

      Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 - read together with Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) - requires that a confession taken more than six hours after arrest and before presentment be suppressed if there was unreasonable or unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate judge.

      Federal law enforcement officials identified Johnnie Corley as one of three men who robbed the Norsco Federal Credit Union in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 16, 2003. See U.S. v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir.

      Written by

      Edited by

      Additional Resources

      Submit for publication
      0
      Subscribe to Fifth Amendment